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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I.

WERE SUFFICIENT FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF PECK'S
MOTION TO DISMISS?

A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of
State

law that should be reviewed for correctness.
P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1994). See also, State

v.

v.

Taylor,

Maestas,

884

652 P.2d

903 (Utah 1982) .
ISSUE II.

WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER? WAS A
MISTAKEN COMMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE
HARMLESS ERROR?

When reviewing the findings of a trial judge sitting without
a jury, an appellate court will overturn a guilty verdict only if
it is clearly erroneous. State
1991).

Harmless

error

is

v.
an

Taylor,
error

818 P.2d
that

is

1030

(Utah

sufficiently

inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
outcome of the proceedings would be affected.

State

827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992).
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v.

Hamilton,

ISSUE III.

DOES THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE
TRIAL COURT NEGATE ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS
OF INNOCENCE?

This issue is similar to a allegation of insufficient evidence
and, therefore, should be reviewed in a light most favorable to the
verdict and the verdict should be reversed only if the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must entertain a reasonable doubt.

State

v.

j

Lyman, 352 Utah

Adv. Rep 13(Utah App. 1998).
ISSUE IV.

DOES PECK'S BRIEF FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING THE VERDICTS OF THE
TRIAL COURT?

When attacking the findings of fact of a trial court the
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings of fact, and then demonstrate that the evidence,
including all reasonable inference drawn therefrom, is insufficient
to support the findings against an attack. State

v.

Moosman,

794

P.2d 474 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES
§76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated
§

76-5-108.

Protective

orders

restraining

abuse

of

another - Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to
a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title

2
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i

30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12,
who intentionally violates that order after having been properly
served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This

case

involves

a prosecution

and

conviction

for

two

violations of §76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, "Protective Orders
Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation", in the Third District
Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Informations

charging

three

separate

violations

of

a

protective order and one charge of telephone harassment were filed
against Edward Peck ("Peck") during the spring of 1997. The cases
were consolidated and on March 9, 1998, a bench trial on the
consolidated charges was held before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
of the Third District Court.
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
At trial, Peck was convicted of two counts of Protective
Orders Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation. The third protective
order violation and the telephone harassment charge resulted in a
verdict of not guilty. Peck was sentenced to serve fifteen days in
jail which was suspended, was fined $100, and was put on probation
to the Court for a period of twelve months. (Record P. 11)
A Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on June 15, 1998.
Due to a defect in the sentence and judgment documents of the trial
court, that appeal was dismissed by Memorandum Decision of the
Court of Appeals in Case No. 980209-CA issued June 4, 1998. The
defect was corrected and a second Notice of Appeal was filed on
April 2, 1998.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. On December 30, 1996, Amanda Eaby
protective

order

against

Peck.

The

("Eaby") obtained a

protective

order

granted

temporary custody of the parties' minor children to Eaby. Also, the
issuing judge modified the standard no contact provisions of the
protective order by adding the handwritten notation, "except as it
relates to visitation." (Transcript P. 5, Lines 11-17; P. 6, Lines
4-10; P. 14, Lines 7-25; P. 15, Lines 1-16; P. 26, Lines 19-25; P.
27, Lines 1-8.)
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2. On February 2, 1997, Eaby was awakened by a telephone call
at her home at approximately 1:00 AM, (Transcript, P. 6, Lines 1125, P. 7, Lines 21-25, P. 8, Lines 1-7.) The phone stopped ringing
before she could answer it, so she entered a direct call-back code
on her telephone to determine the source of the telephone call. The
call-back feature indicated that the telephone call had come from
Mr. Peck's residence. (Transcript, P. 7, Lines 3-8.)
3. On

February

20,1997, at

approximately

11:00

PM, Eaby

received a telephone call from Peck. (Transcript P. 9, Lines 2-5,
15-17.) Eaby answered the telephone, "Hello," whereupon Peck stated
her name. Peck asked if the parties could talk, to which Eaby
responded, "No, we cannot." After a pause, Peck then stated, "We
can't speak for a minute?" Eaby replied, "No." and after a further
pause hung up the phone. (Transcript, P. 9, Lines 20-25; P. 10,
Lines 1-5; P. 18, Lines 7-25; P. 19, Lines 1-3.) This conversation
was marked by several extended pauses or moments of silence between
the parties. (Transcript, P. 9, Lines 22-25; P. 10, Lines 1-3; P.
18, Lines 6-9, 10-22; P. 19, Lines 2-3.)
4 . During the conversation that took place during the February
20, 1997, telephone call, Peck's demeanor appeared to be such that
he was upset or something was wrong. (Transcript, P. 10, Lines 914.)
5. Approximately one half hour after the telephone call, Eaby
discovered a funeral program for a friend of Peck's that had been
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left in her car. (Transcript, P. 10, Lines 15-25.) The deceased
individual was one of Peck's closest friends and Peck was listed as
a pall bearer at the funeral. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 1-9.) Peck
was the only individual who knew both Eaby and the deceased and was
also privy to Eaby" s address. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 5-6; P. 22,
Lines 11-22 . )
6. On March 24, 1997, Eaby received a telephone call from Peck
at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 AM. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 15-23.)
Upon

hearing

and

recognizing

Peck's

voice,

Eaby

hung

up

the

telephone.
7. At the time of each of the above described calls, the
parties'

children

were

with

Eaby,

and

Peck

did

not

discuss

visitation, nor did he have any known reason to be calling to
discuss visitation. (Transcript, P. 10,Lines 6-8; P. 12, Line 25;
P. 13, Lines 1-8; P. 23, Lines 22-25.)
8. During the period encompassed by these telephone calls, the
parties'

had

no

contact

regarding

visitation.

Visitation

was

handled through the respective mothers of Eaby and Peck. This was
a system that had been agreed upon in Court at the time of the
issuance of the protective order. (Transcript, P. 13, Lines 1-15,
P. 28, Lines 16-21.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

SUFFICIENT FACTS WERE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF
PECK'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

Sufficient evidence was presented during the prosecution's
case

in

chief

to

support

each

of the

elements

of

the

crime

"Protective Orders Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation," §76-5108, Utah Code Annotated. Eaby testified that she received a series
of late night/early morning telephone calls from Peck. During the
call she received on February 20, 1997, the parties engaged in a
short conversation interspersed with several lengthy moments of
silence. At no time during this conversation did Peck raise the
issue of visitation, which was the only reason he was permitted to
contact Eaby. During this call, Peck appeared to Eaby to be upset.
Shortly after the call, Eaby found in her vehicle a funeral notice
for a close friend of Peck's. She testified that she believed Peck
could be the only person who would place such a notice in her
vehicle.
The other conviction was based upon a call from Peck received
by Eaby on March 24, 1997. This call occurred at approximately 1:00
or 1:30 AM. Upon hearing and recognizing Peck's voice, Eaby hung up
the telephone. With respect to both this call and the previous
call, Eaby testified that the parties' children were with her at
the time of the call, that there was no need for a discussion with
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Peck regarding visitation, that in fact, no discussions with Peck
regarding visitation occurred at any time during this time period,
and

that

the

parties

had

arranged

visitation

through

their

Based on the foregoing, the City had established a prima

facie

respective mothers.

case as to each element of the offense charged.
II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER. A
MISTAKE IN THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE WAS HARMLESS ERROR.

The trial court judge made an incorrect statement in his post
verdict discussion as to one of the reasons why he believed Eaby's
testimony to be more credible than Peck's. Given the substantial
evidence contained in the record and the other reasons regarding
credibility that were stated by the judge, this mistaken comment
constitutes harmless error.
Also, it appears from the transcript that the source of the
judge's mistake was an incorrect characterization of the evidence
by Peck's defense attorney during closing argument. Since parties
cannot take advantage of errors which they lead the court into
committing, this issue should be disregarded.
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III. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL
COURT NEGATES ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF
INNOCENCE.
Peck's argument that the judge was required to acquit him
because there existed a reasonable hypothesis of innocence is based
upon an overbroad reading of State

v.

Layman,

953 P.2d 782 (Utah

App. 1998) and is in conflict with the evidence presented at trial.
The reasonable hypothesis of innocence ruling set forth in the
Layman

case is only applicable where the evidence consists solely

of undisputed, circumstantial evidence and it does not require the
prosecutor to disprove every reasonable hypothesis. In this case,
there

is direct

evidence

of the elements

of the crime. Eaby

testified that Peck made telephone calls to her. She also testified
that during

their

conversation, albeit

a brief

one, the only

allowable topic, visitation, was not discussed. Finally, both Eaby
and Peck testified that they did not discuss visitation during the
time period that the phone calls were made. Peck's own testimony
provides direct evidence rebutting his "reasonable hypothesis of
innocence/' Peck testified that he did not make the telephone calls
at all. This puts him in the obviously

untenable position of

arguing that the calls may have been made for the allowed purpose
of visitation and yet, at the same time testifying under oath that
the calls were not made at all.
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IV.

PECK'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING
VERDICTS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

THE
THE

All of the issues raised by Peck in this appeal have the
common theme of attacking the factual findings of the trial court.
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal,
the appellant must show that the findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. In order to show error, the appellant must marshal all
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact
and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against an attack. State

v. Moosman,

794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990) . Peck

has failed to adequately marshal the evidence against him in this
case which constitutes a separate and valid reason for affirming
the decision of the trial court.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

SUFFICIENT FACTS WERE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF
PECK'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating §76-5-108,
Utah

Code

Another."

Annotated,
There

are

''Protective
two

elements

Orders
to

Restraining

this

crime.

Abuse

First,

of
the

defendant must be subject to a properly served protective order
issued pursuant to one of the applicable co-habitant abuse acts.
Second, the defendant must have intentionally violated the terms of
the order.
10
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In this case, there was ample evidence presented relating to
each of these elements to support the trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss. The evidence presented by the prosecution's case
in chief clearly demonstrated a prima

facie

violation of §76-5-108

on both February 20th and March 27th, 1997.
The facts presented in the prosecution's case in chief (found
on pages 5-24 of the Transcript)are as follows:
February 20, 1997 Violation
1. . The victim, Amanda Eaby, testified that at approximately
11:00 PM on February 20, 1997, she received a telephone
call from Peck.
2.

Eaby testified that after she said "hello", Peck said her
name. She further testified that at that point, since she
was shocked to be contacted by Peck, she did not respond.
She testified that after a pause, Peck then stated, "Can
we talk for a minute?" Eaby replied, "No, we cannot," and
there was again a pause in the conversation. Eaby then
stated, "Okay, I'm going to hang up now." Eaby further
testified that Peck then stated, "We can't speak for a
minute?" To which she replied, "No," paused again, and
then hung up the phone.

3.

Eaby testified that during this conversation, there was
"... a lot of silence on the phone . . . , " and "... there were
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great moments

of, you

there."

know, no

talking

and

sitting

)

In response to a question regarding her ability to tell
Peck's emotions from his voice during the call, Eaby
testified, "He seemed like something was wrong, like he
wanted to speak with me. And it bothered me to have him
on the phone and sound upset like that."
Eaby further testified that approximately one half hour
after the telephone call, she went out to lock up her
car. During that process she found a funeral program for
a friend of Peck's that had not been in her car prior to
the phone call. She also testified

that the

funeral

described in the program was for one of Peck's closest
friends. Finally, she testified that she knew of no one,
besides Peck, who would have any reason to put that
funeral announcement in her car, that the funeral notice
was the only notification she received of the death of
Peck's friend, and that other friends of Peck, who also
knew the deceased, did not know where she lived.
On the subject of visitation, Eaby testified that at no
time during the aforementioned telephone call did Peck
mention their children or visitation. She also testified
that at the time the protective order was issued, the
parties had agreed to arrange visitation through their
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respective mothers. The children were with her at the
time of the call since they did not have over night
visits with Peck, and she also testified that she and
Peck

had

no

direct

contact

whatsoever,

regarding

visitation, during the time period encompassing the three
telephone

calls

which

were

the

subject

of

the

prosecution.
March 24, 1997.
1.

Eaby testified that on or about March 24, 1997, she
received a telephone call from Peck at approximately 1:00
or 1:30 AM.

2.

With regard to the conversation during this telephone
call, Eaby testified, "As well as some of the other
instances as soon as I answered the phone and heard his
voice and recognized who it was and what it was about, I
hung up the phone."

3.

With respect to the content of this telephone call, Eaby
testified, "I can't imagine that it would be anything
about visitation in the middle of the night while I'm
sleeping..." As she had previously testified, visitation
had been arranged through the parties' respective mothers
and she never arranged visitation with Mr. Peck by phone
during this period.

13
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The evidence presented by the prosecution's case in chief, as
set forth above, clearly makes a prime

facie

case as to each

element of the offense charged.
The first element of the crime is not at issue. Eaby obtained
a protective order on December 30, 1996, and Peck was present in
court and was fully aware of the order. Among other things, the
protective

order

prohibited

any

contact,

including

telephone

contact, between the parties. Paragraph 3, the no contact section
of the order, however, had been modified by the issuing judge with
the phrase, ''Except for purposes of visitation." Therefore, the no
contact provision of the protective order was not absolute and
contact was allowed between'the parties for purposes of visitation.
The second element of this crime is whether or not Peck
intentionally violated the modified no contact provision of the
protective order. The above described testimony of Ms. Eaby sets
forth strong evidence for finding that Peck intentionally violated
the protective order.
With respect to the February 20, 1997, telephone call, the
testimony showed that Eaby received a late night telephone call
from Peck. According to her testimony, this call included at least
some conversation and included several long pauses during which
nobody spoke. Finally, Eaby hung up the telephone. She testified
that there was no discussion of visitation with Peck during this
telephone call, nor did she discuss any visitation with Peck by
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telephone during this time period. Based upon her description of
the

telephone

conversation,

it

is

clear

that

Peck

had

ample

opportunity to state his business and he utterly failed to do so.
The clear terms of the protective order allowed Peck to contact
Eaby by telephone for purposes of visitation, and for that purpose
only. Despite having the opportunity of several seconds of silence
during various parts of the conversation, Peck failed to state the
purpose of his call. Obviously a call such as this violates the
terms of the protective order. Peck cannot simply call, not state
his business, yet remain on the phone and then, when confronted
with a violation of the order, fall back on the notion that he
possibly would have raised visitation issues at some point during
the call.
The fact that this call had nothing to do with visitation is
corroborated by other evidence. Eaby testified that Peck seemed
upset when she was talking to him. Also, she found the funeral
notice for Peck's friend in her car shortly after the telephone
call. She testified that it was her belief that the only person
that could have left the notice there was Peck since none of Peck's
other friends would have known where she lived. Also, she testified
that she had received no other notice regarding this funeral.
Finally, an additional corroborating factor is that Eaby and
Peck apparently never had a discussion regarding visitation. She
testified that visitation was handled through their respective
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mothers, as had been arranged at the time of the issuance of the
protective order, and that she and Peck never discussed visitation
by telephone during this period. If Peck has been calling for
visitation

reasons, it

seems

that

those

reasons

mysteriously

disappeared.
Taken as a whole, the above evidence is sufficient to defeat
Peck's Motion to Dismiss the February 20, 1997, violation.
Many of the same arguments can be made with respect to the
March

24, 1997, telephone

call. This call was also clearly a

violation of the protective order.
Ms. Eaby's testimony was that on March 24, 1997, she received
a telephone call from Peck at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 in the
morning. While the parties had very little conversation during this
call, there is every indication from the evidence that this call
had nothing to do with visitation.
First, the timing of the call is important. Eaby testified
that this call woke her up at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 AM in the
morning. This followed the pattern of the previous two phone calls
which she received on February 20, 1997, and February 2, 1997. All
of these calls occurred either very late at night
February 20, 1997) or in the early morning

hours

(11:00 PM on
(1:00 AM on

February 2, 1997, and 1:00 AM or 1:30 AM on March 24, 1997). The
timing of this call, when combined with the fact that there were no
discussions regarding visitation during the call, nor were there
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any other discussions by telephone regarding visitation during this
time period, demonstrate that this call is simply one more in a
series of late night telephone calls. Such late night calls are
naturally

frightening

to

a victim

who

has

had

to

resort

to

obtaining a protective order from the caller. Since Eaby had her
children with her at the time and there were no discussions with
Peck during this period regarding visitation, there was obviously
no emergency, and in fact, no visitation motive whatsoever, for
Peck to call Eaby at 1:00 or 1:30 AM. From this evidence, the judge
correctly

inferred

that

it was

not

Peck's

intent

to

discuss

visitation and therefore, the call was in violation of the statute.
Based

on

the

established a prima

foregoing,
facie

it

is

clear

that

the

City

had

case with respect to each violation. The

parties had agreed that the protective order was in place, and the
evidence that was presented made it obvious that it was not Peck's
intention to discuss visitation because of the timing and nature of
the calls and the supporting

evidence. The

trial court

judge

correctly denied Peck's Motion to Dismiss.
II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER. A
MISTAKE IN THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE WAS HARMLESS ERROR.

Peck asserts that the court's judgment in this case is not
supported by the evidence. His basis for this contention is one of
the court's post verdict comment regarding Peck's credibility.
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The

{

trial court judge commented that Mr. Peck stated, "I don't recall
making such calls," with respect to certain questions he had been
asked. A review of the transcript reveals that Peck is correct and
the trial court judge was mistaken in his recollection of that
statement. However, in light of the source of the judge's confusion
and the other substantial evidence that supports the verdict, trial
judge's mistaken recollection is harmless error.
This

issue was not preserved

objection or other action by Peck.
being

in the record below by any
In essence, the issue that is

raised now on appeal is really just a challenge

to the

sufficiency of the evidence. In a criminal case a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is governed by a clear and ambiguous
standard. The Utah Supreme Court has articulated that standard as
follows:

7
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge
sitting without a jury, this court will
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is
clearly erroneous. State
v. Walker,
743 P.2d
191, 192-193 (Utah 1987).The basis of this
standard is Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, "Findings by the Court":
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury. . . the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon... Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.

State

v.

Taylor,

818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991)(Footnote omitted).
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The Utah Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous"
standard as follows:
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court, on the entire evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.
Further clarification is offered by Wright and
Miller: The appellate court... does not
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The
mere fact that on the same evidence the
appellant court might have reached a different
result does not justify it in setting the
findings aside. It may regard a finding as
clearly erroneous only if the finding is
without
adequate
evidentiary
support
or
induced by an erroneous view of the law.
State v.

Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals has followed the guidance
of the Utah Supreme Court in State

v.

Germonto,

886 P.2d 50 (Utah

1983), by stating:
In
considering
the
challenge
to
the
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
verdict... If, during the review, we find some
evidence or inferences upon which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, we affirm.
State

v.

Perry,

871 P.2d 576, 581 (Utah App. 1994).

In this case, the evidence presented to the trial court was
more than sufficient to sustain the conviction. The bulk of that
evidence is set forth in Argument I above and was presented in the
City's

case in chief. In addition, a crucial portion of that
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evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Peck. Peck admitted
i

that he had not talked to Eaby regarding visitation during the
period of the telephone calls. Peck was asked:
Q. "Now, subsequent to all of this, have you had some times when
you've talked to her, communicated with her with respect to the
subject of visitation?"
A. "I haven't."
Q."Or any subject?"
A. "No."
Transcript, P. 28 Lines. 16-21.
The mistaken comment made by the trial court judge was but one
of several comments made by the judge in explaining his verdict. A
close examination of the transcript reveals the potential source of
the judge's confusion. In closing argument, Peck's defense attorney
stated, "He says he didn't call her on these occasions, or
recall

calling

her on those

occasions."

didn't

He also stated, "That could

have been February 2d, but we don't know and he doesn't have
specific memory for the dates."
Transcript, P. 35, Lines 4-6 and 8-10.
These statements by Peck's defense attorney appear to be the
obvious source of the judge's mistaken comment.
Peck should not be allowed to profit from a mistaken comment
of the judge if it appears that Peck was the source of the mistake.
Parties cannot take advantage of errors when the party led the
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court into committing the error. State

v. Dunn,

850 P2d 1201 (Utah

1993).
In any event, the error by the trial court judge is harmless.
Harmless

errors

are

those

errors

which

are

sufficiently

inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.

State

v.

Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) . The burden of showing that an error
has been harmful rests with the complaining party.
Robertson,
burden.

923 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997).

State

v.

Peck has not carried that

To the contrary, as has been demonstrated, there is ample

evidence in the record to support the convictions. The trial court
stated several other reasons for finding Ms. Eaby's testimony to be
more credible than Mr. Peck's. Among these were Mr. Peck's failure
to recall even the approximate date of his alleged "accidental"
call to Ms. Eaby, and the corroborating evidence of the funeral
notice that was found in her car.
Also, with respect to the funeral notice, the judge correctly
recognized that Peck was never questioned and, therefore, never
provided testimony about the notice. As a result, the only evidence
before the Court regarding the funeral notice was the testimony of
Ms. Eaby as to where and when it had been found and her belief that
it could have no source other than Mr. Peck. The court's reliance
on this testimony is proper and is a natural consequence of Peck's
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failure to deny or explain the testimony of Eaby. State

v.

Romero,

554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
Based on the above, and the evidence as set forth in the
previous argument, the verdict of the trial court is supported by
the evidence, is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, should be
affirmed.
III.

THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL
COURT NEGATES ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF
INNOCENCE.

Peck relies on the case of State

v. Layman,

953 P.2d 782 (Utah

App. 1998), in advancing a theory that a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence

exists

and,

therefore, the

trial

court

should

have

acquitted Peck. This reliance on Layman is misplaced, since a close
reading of the case indicates that it is simply not applicable to
the case at bar.
The reasonable hypothesis of innocence ruling set forth in the
Layman
applies

case has very clearly defined parameters for its use. It
only

to

cases

where

the

evidence

consists

solely

of

undisputed, circumstantial evidence and it does not require the
prosecutor

to disprove

P.786; see also State

v.

every
Lyman,

reasonable

hypothesis. Layman

at

352 Utah Adv. Rep 13, Footnote 3

(Utah App. 1998.)
The Layman

case was such a case where the only evidence was

undisputed and circumstantial. Layman,

at Footnote 3.
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In this case, there is direct evidence of the elements of the
crime. Eaby testified that Peck made telephone calls to her. She
also testified that during their conversation, albeit a brief one,
the only allowable topic, visitation, was not discussed. Finally,
both Eaby and Peck testified that they did not discuss visitation
during the period that the phone calls were made.
The majority of the Court in Layman

recognized that, " *The

existence of one or more alternate reasonable hypothesis does not
necessarily

prevent

the

[fact

finder]

"from

concluding

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' State

v.

that

Blubaugh,

904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995, cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749
(Utah

1996)",

Layman,

at

Footnote

approvingly quoted the Blubaugh

4.

The

Layman

Court

also

decision with regard to conflicting

evidence supporting different hypothesis. The Court stated, "We
also note that in Blubaugh,

the jury was presented with conflicting

evidence supporting the different hypothesis; in such instances,
A

it is within the province of the jury to judge the credibility of

the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject these
alternative hypothesis.'" Layman,

at Footnote 4.

The case at bar is a case with conflicting evidence supporting
different hypothesis. However, there is no evidence supporting the
hypothesis that Peck advances in his brief. Peck's own testimony at
trial

directly

conflicts

with

the

reasonable

hypothesis

of

innocence that he now claims. Peck testified at trial that he did
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not make the telephone calls. This is direct evidence rebutting the
notion that the calls may have been made for visitation purposes,
his "hypothesis of innocence." Peck is arguing that the calls may
have been made for the allowed purpose and yet at the same time has
testified that the calls were not made. Peck cannot have it both
ways .
Peck's contention that a reasonable hypothesis of innocence
exists in this case is not founded upon evidence presented to the
trial court and should therefore, be disregarded.
IV.

PECK'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING
VERDICTS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

THE
THE

All of the issues raised by Peck in this appeal have a common
theme.

The

trial

court's

reasoning

in

denying

the Motion

to

Dismiss, the assertion that the court's findings are not supported
by

the

record,

and

the

allegation

that

the

court

ignored

a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence, are all essentially attacks
upon the sufficiency of the evidence and the factual findings of
the trial court. The law of the State of Utah on this subject is
well settled. When challenging the findings of fact of the trial
court on appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact
were clearly erroneous. In order to show error, the appellant must
marshal
findings
all

all

of

the

evidence

in

support

of

the

trial

court's

of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including

reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom,

is

insufficient
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to

support the findings against an attack. State

v. Moosman,

794 P.2d

474 (Utah 1990).
Much of the evidence presented

to the trial court which

supports the verdict and/or corroborates the testimony of Eaby is
absent from Peck's brief. Peck's failure to adequately marshal the
evidence against him is a separate and valid reason for affirming
the decision of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
There is sufficient evidence to support both the trial court's
denial of Peck's Motion to Dismiss and the ultimate verdicts in
this

case.

Also,

Peck's

argument

regarding

the

"reasonable

hypothesis of innocence" is in direct conflict with the testimony
provided by him at trial.

Finally, Peck has failed to adequately

marshal the evidence against himself and then demonstrate that the
trial court reached a clearly erroneous decision.

The verdicts of

the trial court should be affirmed.

DATED this

ffr

day of ri£{lu4&J

, 1999.
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